SDG16: Strengthening the United Nations through the Accountable Veto Resolution Initiative

By Georgiana F Bugeag

On 22nd May, the UN Engagement Team of UN Association Scotland held the first in a series of events exploring the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with a focus on SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. The session centred on one of the most pressing challenges facing the UN today: the legitimacy crisis of the Security Council, and the need for institutional reform, including the Accountable Veto Resolution Initiative (AVRI).

The UN Engagement Team exists to promote dialogue on the United Nations' role in global governance and sustainable development, bringing public, academic, and civil society voices into conversation about the future of the international system.

We would like to extend our warm thanks to Dr David Cheesman, Secretary of UNA Luton, for his insightful and thought-provoking presentation. Thank you to you and everyone contributing to the AVRI,  which provided the foundation for this important discussion.

Background

SDG 16 calls for “peaceful and inclusive societies,” ensuring access to justice for all and building “effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” As the culmination of the UN’s institutional architecture, the Security Council plays a critical role in achieving this goal. However, its current structure and functioning raise concerns about justice, inclusiveness, and accountability. A growing number of global stakeholders, from governments to civil society organisations, see the Security Council as not being representatives of the global world as it should be. Moreover, the deadlock in responding to major conflicts, such as in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan, has exposed structural weaknesses that threaten global peace.

Key Discussions

1.UN Charter: The Legal Framework

The UN Charter is the backbone of the international system. Its legal structure grants the Council sweeping powers, but it also entrenches the privilege of the permanent five. This section highlights the key articles that empower, but also constrain, the UN’s ability to act fairly, effectively, and accountably. Reform begins with knowing the rules. The following articles of the UN Charter are critical to understanding the Council's role and limitations.

Article 23: The Security Council comprises fifteen members, of which five are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Elected seats are distributed regionally to ensure geographical representation, with five new members chosen each year. This structure blends continuity through the permanent five (P5) with wider participation via the rotating electing ten (E10).

Article 24: The Security Council holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, as entrusted by all UN Member States. Under this mandate, its decisions (particularly those under Chapter VII) are binding on all Member State. In practice, this enables the Council to authorise measures ranging from sanctions to peacekeeping operations.

Article 27: Each Council member has one vote, and at least nine affirmative votes are required to adopt any decision. However, for substantive matters, all five permanent members must agree; a single “no” vote by any P5 member constitutes a veto. This gives the P5 a decisive check over the Council’s substantive actions.

Article 108: Any amendment must first win the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly and then be ratified by two-thirds of UN Member States, crucially including each of the P5 Security Council members. As a result, proposals to restrict or abolish the veto can only take effect if they secure both the Assembly’s super-majority and unanimous P5 ratification, rendering such reform virtually unattainable without their consent.

2. Understanding the Veto Problem

The veto power is widely seen as a major obstacle to the Council’s effectiveness and fairness. France and the UK have not used the veto since 1989. When one permanent member perceives a proposed resolution as beng against its national interests, it may veto even broadly supported measures. The veto institutionalises the privilege of the P5, reinforcing a post-1945 status quo that many argue is no longer reflective of contemporary geopolitical realities or of the interests of the wider UN membership.

Smaller or non-permanent member states often view the veto as undemocratic, undermining perceptions of fairness and leading to calls for either veto restraint (e.g. voluntary self-restraint in cases of mass atrocity) or its outright abolition.  Moreover, this imbalance undermines SDG 16 and the democratic legitimacy of the UN, because a few states can block action regardless of the global consensus.

Image from Peace Security Data Hub

3. Legal and Procedural Tools for Reform

Resolution 377A “Uniting for Peace” (1950): adopted in 1950, this allows the General Assembly to convene an emergency special session whenever the Security Council is blocked by a veto. The session is called within 24 hours. It can recommend collective measures, including sanctions or even military action, to address threats to international peace and security. Although these recommendations are not legally binding, they carry strong political weight and enable the wider UN membership to act when the Council is paralysed. This mechanism has been used on eleven occasions since its adoption.

ACT Code of Conduct (2013): is a voluntary 2013 pledge by 120 UN Member States to refrain from using the Security Council veto in cases of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Signatories agree to abstain rather than veto atrocity-related resolutions and, if they do issue a veto, to publicly justify their decision. Though non-binding and lacking the participation of Russia, China and the US, it seeks to build a political norm that places the prevention of mass atrocities above narrow veto politics.

Resolution 76/262 (2022): whenever a permanent member of the Security Council casts a veto, the President of the General Assembly must convene a debate on that very subject within ten working days. The resolution brings every exercise of the veto before the full Assembly, ensuring that the reasons behind such a blockage are laid bare and discussed openly. While Resolution 76/262 does not itself offer alternative courses of action, it complements the “Uniting for Peace” procedure by guaranteeing a dialogue. In practice, these debates can draw wider international attention and lay the groundwork for further Assembly initiatives. These cannot compel the Council to reverse its veto. Since its adoption, Resolution 76/262 has been invoked on ten separate occasions.

The International Court of Justice Initiative: proposed in 2020 by Professor Jennifer Trahan, it asks the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion on whether the five permanent members’ veto in the Security Council is subject to any legal limits. This is particularly when atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are at stake. If the Court affirms that principles such as good faith, jus cogens norms or the Charter’s peace-and-security duties limit use of the veto, it would strengthen UN legitimacy and reduce the deadlocks in the face of mass atrocities.

4. The Accountable Veto Resolution Initiative

The Accountable Veto Resolution Initiative (AVRI) seeks to ensure that every use of the veto by a permanent member of the Security Council is rigorously tested against the UN Charter and international law, while awaiting for a full Charter amendment. Under AVRI, whenever a P5 member casts a veto, the ten elected members (the E10) immediately convene as a Veto Scrutiny Panel (VSP). Drawing on Resolution 76/262, the Panel reviews the circumstances within ten business days, examining any report the vetoing member submits and inviting evidence from other Member States, legal experts, and civil-society actors.

Building on Resolution 377 A (“Uniting for Peace”), AVRI empowers the Panel’s two rapporteurs to call an emergency session of the General Assembly. The VSP then prepares an Outcome Report that tests whether the veto violated Articles 1 and 2 (the purposes and principles of the UN, including the Responsibility to Protect and treaty obligations), or Article 27 (the duty to abstain when a member is party to the dispute). If two-thirds of the E10 conclude that the veto was not compliant, and that disunity among the P5 has prevented the Council from fulfilling its primary responsibility under Article 24, they may recommend that the Assembly consider collective action, including armed force if necessary.

In essence, AVRI creates a straightforward, Charter-compliant process, implementable by a simple majority in the General Assembly, to hold the P5 accountable for each veto, strengthen the role of the elected members, and ensure that no veto can indefinitely block the international community’s duty to maintain peace and security. The AVRI proposal was developed by the UNA-LASER Working Group on the Security Council Veto: Andi Carstensen, Anita Punwani, David Cheesman, Gillian Douglass, John Fowler, Maria Iosif,  and Sheila Kesby.

Conclusions

The first UNA Scotland engagement event on SDG 16 highlighted a vital truth: reforming the UN Security Council is necessary. The discussion brought together legal insights, policy mechanisms, and civic engagement, demonstrating how a multilateral, inclusive approach can support the evolution of global governance in line with the principles of peace, justice, and accountable institutions. Through a close examination of the UN Charter, critical reform tools, and innovative initiatives such as the AVRI, it became evident that the international system already possesses the legal and procedural foundations to hold the powerful to account. AVRI exemplifies how procedural innovation when rooted in existing Charter provisions, has the potential to ensure the veto power is no longer a shield against responsibility.

In drawing together experts, activists, and policymakers, the event emphasised the indispensable role of civil society in shaping a more democratic, transparent, and responsive UN. It showed that progress towards SDG 16 does not rely solely on structural reform but also on collective will, persistent scrutiny, and bold innovative ideas. The path ahead demands both realism, as global conflicts grow more complex and public trust in international institutions erodes. Strengthening the United Nations begins with strengthening its accountability, which in turn brings the world closer to the peaceful, just, and inclusive future envisioned by the Sustainable Development Goals.

Sources

International Legal Documents

Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) arts 23–24, 27. 

UNGA Res 377A (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V). 

UNGA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/262. 

UNGA Res 79/1 (22 September 2024) UN Doc A/RES/79/1).

Other

Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (2013) https://www.globalr2p.org/calling-for-a-unsc-code-of-conduct/accessed 27 May 2025.

Liechtenstein Mission to the UN, ‘Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council (A/RES/76/262)’ Press Release GA/12417 (26 April 2022) https://docs.un.org/en/a/RES/76/262 accessed 27 May 2025.

Trahan J, Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes (Cambridge University Press 2020).

United Nations, Security Council Data – Vetoes Since 1946 (Dataset ID: DPPA-SCVETOES)https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES accessed 27 May 2025.

United Nations, ‘Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’ https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/ accessed 25 May 2025.

United Nations Association Luton, ‘Accountable Veto Resolution Initiative (AVRI)’ https://www.una-luton.uk/accountable-veto-resolution accessed 13 June 2025.

United Nations Association Scotland, ‘First UN Engagement Workshop on SDG 16’ LinkedIn (22 May 2025) https://uk.linkedin.com/company/united-nations-association-scotland accessed 25 May 2025.

United Nations General Assembly, ‘“Uniting for Peace”’ Res 377 A (V) UN GAOR, 5th sess, UN Doc A/RES/377(V) (3 November 1950) https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html accessed 25 May 2025.